Tax uncertainty is often claimed to be harmful for investments. Capital taxes, such as property and wealth taxes, are particularly exposed to tax uncertainty. Capital tax uncertainty emerges from expected tax reforms, the unclear outcome of future tax audits, and simpli…ed estimates of capital tax bases in investment models. Uncertain returns on investment as well as stochastic taxation contribute to overall uncertainty and may significantly a¤ect investment decisions. Hitherto, it is unknown how capital tax uncertainty a¤ects investment timing. However, it is well known that both uncertainty and capital tax may be harmful for investment and decelerate investment activities. We are the …rst to study the investment timing e¤ects of stochastic capital taxes in a real options setting with risky investment opportunities. Our results indicate that even risk neutral investors are sensitive with respect to capital tax risk and may react in a surprising manner to a newly introduced stochastic capital tax. As an apparently paradoxical investment e¤ect, we …nd that increased capital tax uncertainty can accelerate risky investment if such uncertainty is su¢ ciently low compared to cash ‡ow uncertainty. In contrast, high capital tax risk delays high-risk innovative investment projects. To reduce unintended consequences of uncertain tax policy, tax legislators and tax authorities should avoid high levels of capital tax uncertainty. Broadening the capital tax base or increasing the capital tax rate induces ambiguous timing e¤ects. Furthermore, high-growth investments are likely to be postponed if they experience a capital tax cut. Since investment reactions upon tax reforms are well-known to a¤ect income and wealth distribution, reliable estimations of the impact of taxes on economic decisions are necessary.
Introduction
Tax uncertainty is often claimed to be harmful for investments. Tax systems in most jurisdictions include pro…t and capital taxation. Property, wealth and inheritance taxes are prominent examples of capital taxes. For several reasons capital taxes in particular contribute to tax uncertainty. A survey of 830 tax and …nance executive in 25 jurisdictions (EY 2014) shows that tax practitioners are particularly concerned about tax uncertainty:
"... 85% of US-headquartered companies report they are experiencing more risk or uncertainty around tax legislation or regulation than they were two years ago ... 81% of all companies surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that tax risk and controversy will become more important for their companies in the next two years. ... 82% of all companies surveyed believe their tax function has signi…cant or adequate involvement in the general business strategy and planning process."
As both tax risk in general and capital taxation are often claimed to be harmful for investment (for empirical evidence see Dye, McGuire, and Merriman 2001 , Allee, Lynch, Petroni, and Schroeder 2015 , Hoppe, Maiterth, and Sureth 2016 and are expected to delay investment activities, we analyze the investment e¤ects of capital tax uncertainty.
Thus, we address the research question: How does uncertainty over (anticipated) capital tax payments a¤ect investment timing decisions?
Capital tax uncertainty already exists if a tax reform discussion takes place. One prominent example is the OECD action plan to curb tax base erosion and pro…t shifting (BEPS).
The OECD has recently published recommendations on how to determine the value of intellectual property (IP) in a digital economy (OECD 2015a, Action 1). However, if IP is subject to capital tax, neither do these recommendations answer all open valuation 1 questions, nor do taxpayers know how the countries will implement these rules into their national tax codes. As the share of IP in a company's overall wealth is growing, so does capital tax uncertainty.
Furthermore, capital tax uncertainty arises from the unclear outcome of a future tax audit, which is di¢ cult to predict as tax issues and tax law can be interpreted di¤erently by taxpayers, …scal authorities, tax auditors and tax courts. As tax laws are often too complicated to be anticipated in detail, taxpayers may use simpli…ed models of capital tax bases in their investment decisions. Moreover, prospective investment projects sometimes only provide relatively weak tax facts, which contributes to a high level of tax uncertainty (for empirical evidence see Mills, Robinson, and Sansing, 2010; Lisowsky, Robinson, and Schmidt, 2013) . Whereas these types of tax uncertainty are not capital tax-speci…c, any type of capital or property tax requires recognition and valuation of the respective assets, which involves considerable uncertainty. Thus, property and wealth taxation especially su¤er from valuation risk and often require single case assessments. Whenever the market value of "capital"cannot be derived from observable prices of recent sales, taxpayers and …scal authorities have to estimate the market value. The estimation of the value of a …rm in this context is particularly challenging as the cash ‡ow that arises from entrepreneurial and business activities is usually random (Müller, 2014) . Furthermore, tax legislators often introduce various di¤erent valuation methods and create tax base assessment uncertainty, which contributes to total uncertainty. In summary, capital tax uncertainty exposure is typically high and realized capital tax payments often appear random from an ex ante perspective.
Despite the claim that capital taxes are harmful, we observe repeated calls for increases in capital taxes such as the (re-) introduction of a general wealth tax (for example, IMF 2013 , IMF 2014 , Piketty 2014 or an increase in taxes on speci…c assets, such as real estate. This is because capital taxes are often considered superior to pro…t taxation in curbing tax evasion and serve both e¢ ciency and equality aims. Although several coun-tries abolished capital taxation during the 1990s and 2000s, there are animated political debates on capital taxation for distributional and …scal purposes, especially in industrialized countries. The following table lists selected countries that are currently discussing or have recently discussed a (re-)introduction of a wealth tax or have conducted a wealth tax reform. Deloitte (2004 Deloitte ( -2015 , EY (2015) , IBFD (2016 ), KPMG (2004 , PwC (2004 PwC ( -2015 The composition of total capital tax revenues varies substantially across countries. Although wealth taxes are highly topical in many jurisdictions' tax reform discussions, wealth taxes, as the most general form of capital taxes, play a rather minor role in countries' overall capital tax revenues. Nevertheless, capital taxes, especially asset-speci…c taxes, such as real estate taxes and property taxes, contribute signi…cantly to public revenues, as can be observed in Figure 1 . For example, the share of property taxes exeeds 3 10% of total tax revenues in Canada, Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States (OECD 2015b). Obviously, even in those countries that do not levy a general wealth tax, capital taxes are important. However, some public economists raise doubts about the e¤ectiveness of capital taxes and suspect that capital taxation could depress investment, lead to capital ‡ight and cause e¢ ciency costs (for example, Auerbach and Hassett 2015) . 1 This in turn could induce even lower total tax revenues than without capital taxation.
Against this background it is important to understand the investment e¤ects of stochastic capital taxes at the micro level in a partial equilibrium setting. Our results are supposed to serve as a foundation for estimations of the bene…ts and costs of capital taxes and should be embedded in a general equilibrium model in future research. In the following, we investigate the impact of stochastic capital taxation and the inherent tax risk on the 1 The e¤ects of wealth taxes have been controversally discussed in previous years. See, e.g., Balogh (1964) , Stiglitz (1969) , Mieszkowski (1972) , Thurow (1972) , Bentick (1979) , Mills (1981) , Brennan and Nellor (1982) , Michalos (1988) , Bird (1991) , Burbidge (1991) , Davies (1991) , Mintz (1991) , and Kocherlakota (2005) . timing of risky investment from a decision-maker's perspective. Our model assumes that an investor may either invest immediately or postpone their investment. We regard the time of investment as an appropriate proxy for an investor's willingness to carry out risky projects. In this sense our paper does not follow the Domar-Musgrave approach but represents a real options paradigm.
Our results indicate that investors who carry out risky investments are sensitive towards capital tax risk. We …nd that capital tax uncertainty, especially valuation risk, a¤ects investment decisions, even under risk neutrality. We identify conditions that induce apparently paradoxical investment e¤ects, meaning counterintuitive results. In contrast to well-known …ndings in portfolio selection models, based on Domar and Musgrave (1944) , paradoxical e¤ects in our model may arise in the absence of risk aversion. These e¤ects can be attributed to the impact of taxes on the value of ‡exibility rather than portfolio-related e¤ects. Surprisingly, we …nd that if a tax regime is characterized by a low level of capital tax uncertainty, an increase in tax volatility, caused, for example, by intensi…ed tax reform discussions, may accelerate investments. Furthermore, high-growth investments are likely to be postponed if they experience a capital tax cut. However, if capital tax uncertainty is already high, further increases of uncertainty tend to delay investment. The magnitude of this e¤ect depends on whether or not the capital tax is asset-speci…c. Thus, broadening the capital tax base tends to accelerate investment for small volatilities and to delay investment for large volatilities. Overall, it is ambiguous whether capital taxes that are limited to speci…c assets, such as real estate are less likely to delay investment than a general wealth tax.
Our …ndings can be regarded as the lower bound of potential e¤ects to be expected under risk aversion and thus suggest that capital tax uncertainty is likely to be even more relevant under risk aversion. Our results indicate that capital tax risk can be substantial and thus must not be neglected.
5
Our model is the …rst to study the investment timing e¤ects of capital tax uncertainty, in particular of capital valuation uncertainty under conditions of irreversibility. We use a general capital tax as a representative for di¤erent types of capital taxes such as taxes on real estate, individual wealth taxes, and taxes on business property, etc. As some countries also levy capital taxes at the corporate level, 2 our approach can also be interpreted as a study of the impact of corporate-level capital taxes on corporate investments. States. Bizer and Judd (1989) highlight that the potential e¢ ciency costs of random tax policy strongly depend on the characteristics of the random tax instrument. Other studies show that tax policy uncertainty can be socially useful (Alm 1988 ). Although we do not aim to draw conclusions about the aggregate e¤ects on investment, tax revenues and wealth distribution, these …ndings motivate us to scrutinize the e¤ects of stochastic capital taxation from a micro-level perspective. Using an analytical model we …nd that the arising distortions with respect to investment decisions are multifold. These distortions are not only highly dependent on the tax risks involved, but also dependent on the economic and tax environment.
Although there are means to shield taxpayers against some types of tax risks, usually tax uncertainty cannot be resolved completely. To reduce the tax risk, taxpayers may request ex ante rulings or letters of expertise from tax advisors or ask the tax authority to provide a real-time audit (Beck and Lisowsky 2014) or even purchase an insurance against tax risk (Logue 2005) . Unfortunately, these instruments are typically either not available, not feasible, too complicated, too imperfect in resolving uncertainty or too expensive (Givati 2009 and De Simone, Sansing, and Seidman 2013) . Moreover, recent research indicates that instruments such as advance tax rulings will often not be requested by taxpayers who are exposed to high tax uncertainty (Diller, Kortebusch, Schneider, and Sureth 2016) . All this implies that capital tax assessments typically involve a signi…cant amount of tax risk that arises from the estimation procedures and from unpredictable outcomes of tax audits.
Prior empirical research, such as Edmiston (2004), provides evidence for the negative impact of tax uncertainty on investments. However, other theoretical and empirical investigations indicate that (pro…t or income) tax uncertainty could encourage or discourage investment and risk taking (Hassett and Metcalf, 1999) . For example, Beck and Jung (1989) (2015) To understand the potential investment e¤ects of stochastic capital taxation, this stream of literature has to be extended with respect to capital tax uncertainty. This is particularly important, as capital taxation in existing tax systems turns out not to be (perfectly) correlated with pro…t taxation. While the e¤ects of stochastic pro…t (or income) taxation at least to some extent have been investigated (Agliardi 2001 , Niemann 2011 , Diller, Kortebusch, Schneider, and Sureth 2016 , the e¤ects of stochastic capital (or property) taxation
have not yet been analyzed under conditions of cash ‡ow uncertainty and irreversibility.
Our results highlight the relevance of capital tax risk for investment decisions and provide novel insights that contribute to the current discussion on re-introducing or extending capital taxation. Capital tax risk may delay high-risk investment, especially as a reaction to a newly introduced capital tax. To reduce unintended consequences of uncertain tax policy, politicians and …scal authorities should avoid too high levels of capital tax uncertainty, which are likely to hinder innovative investment activities.
Model setup
Our model of investment is based on the framework provided by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) that is frequently used for the analysis of tax e¤ects under uncertainty and irreversibility.
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In line with this body of literature we assume that a risk neutral investor 4 has the option to invest in an in…nitely-lived real investment project that yields stochastic cash ‡ows.
For reasons of mathematical simplicity the option to invest is considered perpetual and inherent to the investment opportunity. We abstract from acquired options. The return on investment is subject to pro…t taxation. Moreover, the investment project can be subject to stochastic capital taxation. The investor uses individual calculus for valuation of both the project and the option to invest. We do not need to assume that the spanning property holds, i.e., liquid markets for the assets do not necessarily exist. Thus, our approach is more general and also captures investment projects that cannot be replicated by traded assets. As long as the option to invest is not exercised, available funds yield the risk-free capital market rate. If the option to invest is exercised, the investor gives up all ‡exibility and pays the acquisition cost for the project. There is no obligation to invest within …nite time. If the project conditions do not turn out to be su¢ ciently favorable, the investment project can be in…nitely postponed. We assume that the project is entirely equity-…nanced to separate the tax e¤ects on investment from the …nancing e¤ects.
When investors try to estimate the total risk of investment projects, they should be aware that operational or cash ‡ow uncertainty is not the only source of uncertainty of such projects. Rather, investors have to regard taxation as a random process from an ex ante perspective. Integrating capital taxation as a stochastic process into investment models seems to be an appropriate method to deal with uncertainty regarding the introduction or the increase of a capital tax. It should be noted that stochastic capital taxation already in ‡uences decisions if only a discussion on tax reform takes place, even if a capital tax is currently not (and possibly never) levied.
Since it is the aim of this paper to analyze the combined e¤ects of pro…t and capital taxation on investment timing, the tax treatment of the investment project, the option to invest, and the default alternative (i.e., wait and see) must be properly de…ned. We consider only one level of taxation. This assumption means that the investor is either a sole proprietor, partner in a private partnership or corporation that neglects shareholder taxation.
As long as the investor waits and does not (yet) invest, they earn the risk-free pretax interest rate r that is subject to the tax rate r . In accordance with tax law in several countries the tax rate on …nancial income r 2 [0; 1[ can di¤er from the general pro…t tax rate. 5 Financial assets like bank accounts or bonds that yield interest income can be (and often are) subject to an additional capital taxation at the rate ! 2 [0; 1[.
The variable 2 [0; 1] denotes the fraction of these …nancial assets that is subject to capital taxation. Thereby, we are able to model capital taxes that are asset-speci…c and partially or completely exempt …nancial assets from capital taxation. By de…ning as deterministic, we assume a deterministic capital tax base of …nancial assets. As a result, 5 Examples are countries such as Austria, Croatia, or Germany.
the risk-free discount rate after taxes r that captures the default alternative is de…ned
We assume that the after-tax discount rate is strictly positive. Otherwise, present values could reach economically meaningless in…nite values.
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The parameter also permits us to model di¤erent types of capital taxes and to analyze their possible di¤erent investment e¤ects. If only special assets like real estate are subject to tax while …nancial assets are exempt from this type of capital tax, the parameter is zero, = 0. By contrast, if a general wealth tax including all types of assets is considered, …nancial assets are fully taxable and thus = 1. As a consequence, broadening (narrowing) the capital tax base can be represented by increasing (decreasing) the parameter .
If the investor decides to exercise the option to invest and acquires the investment project, they lose any further timing ‡exibility and are bound to the project until in…nity. If the project is in place, its only bene…ts consist of the future cash ‡ows. Stochastic operating cash ‡ows are subject to pro…t taxation that can also be regarded as a stochastic process.
Uncertainty of pro…t tax payments arises from random tax rates or random tax bases. In order to focus on the e¤ects of capital taxation we do not model operating cash ‡ows, pro…t tax rates, and pro…t tax bases as separate stochastic processes. Instead, we summarize operating cash ‡ows less pro…t tax payments to a single stochastic process (t).
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The capital tax base is determined by the value of tangible and intangible assets, such as machinery, plant, real estate, vehicles, corporate stocks, patents etc., which are attributable to the investment project. The capital tax has to be paid out of the preliminary after-tax cash ‡ow (t). We assume that the capital tax base at time t, which is denoted by W (t), is also a stochastic process. This assumption re ‡ects real-world tax bases quite well if the capital tax base is de…ned as the "fair value", i.e., the market value of the assets attributable to an investment project. Here, cash ‡ow uncertainty leads to capital tax base uncertainty whenever the tax base is correlated with the stochastic cash ‡ows or if a portfolio of various valuation approaches is applicable. Moreover, even if the assessment of the assets and herewith the capital tax base does not involve any uncertainty because the legislator has de…ned a clear valuation procedure without any discretion in valuation, uncertainty may arise, for example, from unclear de…nitions of taxable tangible and intangible assets. This implies uncertainty with respect to the interpretation by the …scal authorities and thereby the outcome of a future tax audit.
In contrast to pro…t taxation, we model the capital tax rate and the capital tax base separately, because the capital tax rate might also a¤ect the after-tax discount rate.
For reasons of mathematical simplicity, the capital tax rate ! (like the tax rate on …nancial income r ) is considered deterministic and constant. In the following, capital tax uncertainty is completely captured in the random capital tax base. This approach primarily addresses the uncertainty that arises from asset valuation. As a result, the total after-tax cash ‡ow (t) is de…ned as
Since the investor is risk neutral the value of the project in place V at time t = 0 is de…ned as the expected net present value
For further results the cash ‡ow process and the capital tax base process have to be de…ned. In accordance with prior literature (see Niemann 2011) we assume that the operating cash ‡ow after pro…t taxes follows an exogenously given arithmetic Brownian 
with ! as the expected growth of the capital tax base, ! as the associated standard deviation, and dz ! as increment of a standard Wiener process. The growth and volatility parameters ! and ! may signi…cantly di¤er from and of the after-tax cash ‡ow process. It should be noted that the default alternative (i.e., wait and see) generates deterministic cash ‡ows (i.e., risk-free interest income) and a deterministic capital tax base.
The capital tax base process of the risky project can be correlated with the …rst process, the cash ‡ow process
where 2 Negative correlations ( < 0) are rather implausible because they would involve deliberately procyclical capital taxation. 10 To depict real-world types of capital taxation, we focus on the cases of uncorrelated or non-perfect positive (0 < 1) correlations.
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Being the di¤erence of two arithmetic Brownian motions, the after-tax cash ‡ow = ! W is itself an arithmetic Brownian motion that can be represented by
with = ! ! as the growth parameter of the total after-tax cash ‡ow,
2 ! ! as the combined standard deviation, 12 and dz also the increment 9 As an example, the tax value of real estate in Austria or in Germany ("Einheitswert") is only weakly related to market values.
10 can also be interpreted as a parameter that captures the tax audit risk. If the …scal authorities audit procyclically, > 0 indicates an increase in tax audit risk with increased cash ‡ow. If they audit countercyclically < 0 implies increased tax audit risk.
11 To generalize our setting we do not assume a strict functional relation of cash ‡ows and the capital tax base. For correlations of = 1 the wealth tax can also be intepreted as a (notional) pro…t tax. 12 We use the standard deviation to model volatility. This operationalization is in line with a large of a standard Wiener process. If the stochastic processes are perfectly correlated ( = 1), total volatility simpli…es to = ! ! . If capital tax base uncertainty is the only source of uncertainty ( = = 0), total volatility amounts to = ! ! .
The assumption of arithmetic Brownian motions permits to write the expected after-tax cash ‡ow at time t as
Consequently, the project value is
Given the value of the investment project, the value of the option to invest can be determined. Since the investor can only decide between waiting and exercising the option, the decision variable is binary and it is easily possible to determine the optimal investment behavior. We will start with the waiting region in which the option is kept alive. As we do not restrict our analysis by assuming a speci…c initial value of the capital tax base at the time of decision making, we implicitly restrict the initial values such that the expected after-tax present value of the project in the waiting region is below the critical investment threshold, which is still to be determined.
The optimal transition to the exercise region will be modeled by boundary conditions.
We use dynamic programming to determine the option value.
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The option to invest does not generate any cash ‡ows. In principle, an option could be relevant for pro…t tax as well as capital tax purposes. For example, the increase or decrease body of literature on di¤erent types of volatility. For recent studies that refer to tax volatility issue in accounting see, e.g., De Simone and Stomberg (2013), Jacob and Schütt (2013) , McGuire, Neuman and Omer (2013) and Neuman, Omer and Schmidt (2016), Guenther, Matsunaga and Williams (2016) . 13 For a comparison of dynamic programming and contingent claims analysis and the resulting tax e¤ects see Sureth (2004, 2005) . of the option value could be taxable or tax-deductible respectively.
14 Alternatively, the option value could be subject to capital taxation. However, tax systems in the real world do not recognize mere business opportunities as taxable assets. Therefore, we neglect tax consequences of the option to invest that might be relevant in ideal tax systems. Thus, the option's after-tax cash ‡ow equals zero in the case considered here.
As long as the option is kept alive, its only bene…t is the expected increase in value. The resulting equilibrium condition implies that the owner of the option expects an instantaneous return that equals the after-tax risk-free rate over an in…nitesimal time interval
Application of Itô's lemma to the stochastic di¤erential dF and further transformation yields the ordinary di¤erential equation
with the solution 
where A > 0 is a constant to be determined. From A; > 0 it is obvious that F ( 1) = 0 holds. This condition means that an option on an underlying with in…nite negative value is valueless.
The solution of the investment problem describes the investment threshold at which it is optimal to exercise the option immediately. To derive this solution two free boundary conditions are needed. The value matching condition requires that the project's bene…ts 14 Acquired real options like exploration rights, e.g., are depreciable under most tax regimes. Depreciation deductions on the option to invest are necessary in some neutral tax systems. See Niemann (1999, pp. 57, 61) . Although real-world tax systems only account for depreciations on acquired options, overall depreciation on (also non-acquired) options would be in line with fair value reasoning. 15 Since the option to invest is perpetual, the time derivative vanishes here.
and hence its expected present value must equal its costs, comprising the acquisition cost and the abandoned option value, at the point of transition
For reasons of simplicity, the acquisition costs are normalized to unity: I 0 = 1. The smooth pasting condition requires the identity of marginal bene…ts and marginal costs at
Substituting and further transformation yields the critical investment threshold
Equation (15) can be interpreted as follows. The expected present value of after-tax cash ‡ows (eq. 9) must reach the acquisition costs I 0 = 1 of a project plus a ‡exibility premium 1 r > 0 to cover the value of the option which is lost due to exercise. 17 The variancedependent ‡exibility premium implies that even risk neutral investors take uncertainty into account for investment timing decisions.
Investment timing e¤ects of stochastic capital taxation
The impact of stochastic capital taxation on investment timing can be determined by computing the partial derivatives of the critical investment threshold with respect to the di¤erent capital tax parameters. These parameters are expected growth of the capital tax base ! , correlation of capital tax base and operating cash ‡ow after pro…t taxes , volatility of the capital tax base ! , taxable fraction of …nancial assets (capital taxation of the default alternative), and capital tax rate ! .
In contrast to traditional (expected) NPV calculations the critical investment threshold in a real options model takes into account that taxation not only a¤ects the cash ‡ows from an investment project, the default alternative as represented by the after-tax interest rate and (potentially) the initial outlay, but also the value of timing ‡exibility, i.e., the option to invest. Thus, the tax e¤ect on the option value should be considered when analyzing variations of tax parameters. Tax e¤ects on option values are one of the reasons why results of real options models di¤er from those of portfolio selection models following Domar and Musgrave (1944) .
Proposition 1 Increasing the expected growth of the capital tax base ! unambiguously increases the critical investment threshold.
Proof. The algebraic sign of the partial derivative is always positive:
This result is intuitive (normal e¤ect). The higher the expected growth of the capital tax base, the higher the expected present value of capital tax payments and hence the critical investment threshold. Consequently, higher growth rates of the capital tax base tend to delay investment. Stated di¤erently, the tax legislator can accelerate investment by permitting depreciation for capital tax purposes ( ! < 0) rather than by prescribing valuation approaches that lead to tax values increasing over time.
Proposition 2 Increasing the correlation of the capital tax base and cash ‡ows unambiguously reduces the critical investment threshold.
Proof. The algebraic sign of the partial derivative is always negative.
Thus, a higher correlation of the stochastic processes reduces total volatility and hereby accelerates investment (normal e¤ect). This result permits an immediate tax policy conclusion. A capital tax base that is closely related to fair values as measured by the expected after-tax present value of a project (i.e., ! 1) accelerates investment compared to an arbitrary valuation for capital tax purposes (i.e., = 0). We use the notion of fair value in the sense of market valuation. We do not imply fair values as de…ned in …nancial accounting. Examples of the consequences can be seen in versions of the real estate tax that have a weak association of tax base and market value. These types of taxes tend to delay real estate investment compared to a fair value approach.
Proposition 3 Increasing the volatility of the capital tax base ! either increases or reduces the critical investment threshold.
Proof. The partial derivative of with respect to ! can take either algebraic sign:
An increase in total volatility increases the critical investment threshold (normal e¤ect).
This result is consistent with traditional option pricing theory, because increased (total) volatility increases option values without changing expected cash ‡ows of the project or the after-tax discount rate. However, increasing the volatility of the capital tax base ! has an ambiguous impact on total volatility :
"normal"tax e¤ect "paradoxical"tax e¤ect
Thus, if the volatility of the capital tax base ! is small compared to cash ‡ow volatility , increased capital tax volatility ! tends to reduce total volatility and hereby accel- 
This result implies the following neutrality condition.
Corollary 1 Capital tax uncertainty does not a¤ect investment timing if
Thus, if the tax legislator does not intend to in ‡uence investment timing by means of capital tax uncertainty but rather seeks for a timing neutral tax system, perfectly calibrated tax and non-tax parameters are necessary to avoid undesired e¤ects. In actual or currently planned tax systems that are not characterized by project-speci…c rules, neutrality is therefore highly unlikely.
With respect to the parameters and ! we de…ne e¤ects of capital taxation as "normal"
if increasing capital taxation of the investment project increases the critical investment threshold and if increasing capital taxation of …nancial assets (default alternative) reduces 20 the critical investment threshold, i.e., if @ =@ ! > 0 or @ =@ < 0. Otherwise, for @ =@ ! < 0 or @ =@ > 0, we call tax e¤ects "paradoxical".
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Proposition 4 Increasing the taxable fraction of …nancial assets either increases or reduces the critical investment threshold.
Proof. The algebraic sign of the partial derivative is ambiguous.
with
Evaluating the partial derivatives in the limiting cases ! 0 and ! 1 yields
From continuity with respect to 0 it follows that @ @ < 0 for small volatilities and @ @ > 0 for su¢ ciently high volatilities.
The special case of = 0 further clari…es the ambiguity of e¤ects.
Hence, the occurance of normal or paradoxical capital tax e¤ects with respect to strongly depends on the levels of the discount rate and capital tax uncertainty. For su¢ ciently high after-tax discount rates r and small volatilities 2 , normal tax e¤ects prevail. As a consequence, for high pre-tax interest rates, real-world levels of the …nancial income tax rate r , and low or moderate levels of the capital tax rate ! , the partial derivative @ =@ is negative, which means that increasing the taxable fraction of …nancial assets reduces the critical investment threshold and hence accelerates real investment. This e¤ect is plausible, because increasing does not a¤ect cash ‡ows from investment and only reduces 18 For paradoxical income tax e¤ects see, e.g., Niemann and Sureth (2013) .
the after-tax discount rate r . Therefore, the present value of the investment project V increases in . As an additional e¤ect of increasing the lower discount rate typically reduces the option value, making immediate investment more attractive. An increased project value and a reduced option value both contribute to accelerated investment.
However, with after-tax discount rates su¢ ciently close to zero, increasing increases the critical investment threshold so that a paradoxical capital tax e¤ects occurs. In these cases, increasing reduces the discount rate such that the expected present value of capital taxes increases relatively more than the present value of cash ‡ows. Moreover, for low or negative growth parameters , high volatilities, and low discount rates, the critical investment threshold tends to increase with a higher taxable fraction (or, equivalently, with a lower discount rate), because for these parameter combinations the option value decreases faster than the project value.
As apparently paradoxical timing e¤ects are likely for high total volatility and/or low discount rates, the tax legislator should consider these cases and should estimate their relative impact on overall investments and thus taxable assets in the economy when deciding on which type of capital tax to implement. When a tax on special non-…nancial assets like real estate is already in place ( = 0), broadening the capital tax base by increasing the taxable fraction of …nancial assets may induce unexpected (and unintended) investment responses when total volatility is high. A similar result can emerge when a general wealth tax ( = 1) is narrowed to a tax on special non-…nancial assets by reducing
. From a tax policy perspective these possible results could be important determinants of revenues from capital taxes and indirectly also of pro…t tax revenues.
Corollary 2 Varying always yields e¤ects opposite to those from varying the pre-tax interest rate r (see eq. (21)).
Whereas the project value V decreases when the interest rate increases, the option value F may increase, decrease, or remain constant.
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The e¤ects of varying the capital tax rate ! are similar to a simultaneous increase of the growth parameter ! and of the default alternative parameter because the capital tax rate a¤ects the net cash ‡ows of the investment project as well as the default alternative,
represented by the after-tax interest rate r . Since Proposition 4 implies that a variation of induces ambiguous timing e¤ects, a similar result can be expected from a variation of ! . However, this e¤ect is mitigated by the expected increase of the capital tax payment, as can be derived from Proposition 1.
Proposition 5 Increasing the capital tax rate ! either increases or reduces the critical investment threshold.
Proof. The algebraic sign of the partial derivative is ambiguous
In the limiting case without tax base uncertainty ( ! = 0), and thus cash ‡ow uncertainty only, the partial derivative simpli…es to
which can take either algebraic sign, as can be shown for
Thus, for 2 < 8r 3 paradoxical capital tax rate e¤ects occur. By contrast, for extreme tax base uncertainty we obtain normal e¤ects
regardless of the levels of , ! , and . Continuity with respect to ! 0 implies that @ @ ! < 0 for small volatilities and @ @ ! > 0 for su¢ ciently high volatilities.
Corollary 3 Under su¢ ciently high pre-tax interest rates paradoxical capital tax rate e¤ects prevail.
Proof. In the limiting case r ! 1 the algebraic sign of the partial derivative is always non-positive:
Here, the capital tax-exempted option value clearly favors the real investment over the default alternative. In contrast to paradoxical e¤ects identi…ed in prior literature under certainty (Wagner and Dirrigl 1980, Sureth and Maiterth 2008) It should be noted that the values for and ! typically di¤er substantially, because is the volatility of cash ‡ows, which can be regarded as the return from an investment into assets, whereas ! denotes the volatility of the capital tax base, i.e. the assessed invested assets. If the default alternative is capital tax-exempt ( = 0), which represents the case of a special asset tax, expression (25) simpli…es to
Even for this capital tax-exempt default alternative, increasing the capital tax rate can especially for = 0. In the latter case, the partial derivative reduces to
so that paradoxical tax e¤ects cannot be observed any more. Figure 4 shows for the case with high capital tax uncertainty ( ! = 2:5), the dashed line for deterministic capital taxes ( ! = 0). We …nd that for small capital tax rates, capital tax uncertainty does not a¤ect investment timing signi…cantly, because total uncertainty is dominated by cash ‡ow uncertainty. For higher capital tax rates, however, neglecting capital tax uncertainty would induce major mistakes in investment timing, as the di¤erence of critical investment thresholds may reach as much as 10% of the initial value. Our results show that identical tax policy actions may yield very di¤erent economic results, which particularly depend on the expected cash ‡ow structure and volatility of the project or industry under consideration. Whatever the tax legislator's objectives may be, it is unlikely that they can be reached by capital taxes, given the ambiguity of investment e¤ects. The tax legislator should therefore state explicitly which type of investment e¤ect is considered desirable. If, for example, investment by high-tech …rms with (typically) increasing cash ‡ows and high risks ( > 0, 0) should be encouraged, reducing the capital tax rate would likely be dysfunctional.
Conclusions and implications
We analyze the impact of capital tax uncertainty on timing decisions of risky investments.
Capital tax uncertainty is typically caused either by tax policy uncertainty or uncertainty in the outcome of tax audits. The valuation of assets in tax audits often leads to adjustments of the capital tax base. This uncertainty in tax assessment has to be anticipated when making an investment decision. An uncertain tax environment is currently created by the mere possibility of future new or increased capital taxes such as wealth or property taxes. Thus, irrespective of the actual future design of a capital tax, it is the threat of new capital taxes, or an increase in existing capital taxes that may already cause uncertainty.
If assets generate stochastic cash ‡ows, the fair value of these assets as measured by present values is also stochastic. Thus, cash ‡ow uncertainty induces capital tax base uncertainty whenever the tax base is correlated with the stochastic cash ‡ows. Additional capital tax uncertainty arises from unclear de…nitions of taxable tangible and intangible assets or when the tax law permits valuation discretion.
By modelling the volatility of the capital tax base as a proxy for all types of capital tax uncertainty we are the …rst to identify the distortive power of stochastic capital taxes 28 on risky investments. We …nd that capital tax volatility ambiguously a¤ects investment The relevance of this e¤ect is supported by our sensitivity analysis of the interaction of volatility and the correlation of the capital tax base and operating cash ‡ows. Increasing the correlation of cash ‡ows and asset values reduces the critical investment threshold and hence accelerates investment. Ceteris paribus, this result somewhat surprisingly implies that fair value accounting for capital tax purposes, which is supposedly correlated with cash ‡ows may be less harmful for real investment than historical cost valuation, which is at best weakly related to cash ‡ows.
Our model and our numerical analysis provide insights for the design of capital taxes in general. We show that speci…c capital taxes like pure property taxes generally induce di¤erent investment timing e¤ects than a general wealth tax that also taxes …nancial assets. Our model reveals that broadening the capital tax base from a special asset tax to a general wealth tax unexpectedly delays risky investment if total volatility is high and interest rates are low. This result helps us to understand that general wealth taxes are much more vulnerable to generate paradoxical investor behavior and thereby counteract tax policy intentions. In this respect, our …ndings explain the empirical …nding that many countries levy property taxes while only a limited number of countries levies wealth taxes.
Furthermore, changes in the capital tax rate can induce either normal or paradoxical investment timing e¤ects. For high-growth investments the critical investment threshold decreases after an increase of the capital tax rate, which can be interpreted as a paradoxical acceleration. Further conditions that favor paradoxical capital tax rate e¤ects are high pre-tax interest rates, high volatilities, and high positive correlations. In contrast, for su¢ ciently low cash ‡ow growth rates, normal reactions are more likely to prevail.
Our results indicate that the tax legislator should be aware of the distortive power of capital tax uncertainty. The large number of parameters that facilitate paradoxical investment responses indicates that such paradoxical tax e¤ects are likely to occur. Therefore, it is doubtful whether the tax legislator's e¢ ciency and redistributive objectives can be reached by capital taxes.
Our analysis is subject to several limitations. We use a purely partial analytical model, which does not allow politicians to draw conclusions about the overall revenue and distributional e¤ects. Rather, our analysis of investment e¤ects should precede an estimation of capital tax revenues. Furthermore, our decision-maker perspective is still characterized by several restrictive assumptions. For example, we abstract from e¤ects of various …-nancing channels but focus on equity …nancing only. Consequently, …nancial constraints, tax shields from interest deductions, and liquidity considerations are disregarded in the model. However, debt …nancing can be implicitly included in our model, assuming that debt-related payments are already included in the cash ‡ows.
Moreover, we abstract from cross-border issues, which are often assumed to o¤er substantial tax avoidance potential. We neglect compliance costs that are likely to increase in tax uncertainty. Like most previous studies from the real options literature we restrict our study to risk neutral investors. We therefore conjecture that our results on the effects of capital tax uncertainty represent a lower bound for such e¤ects on risk averse decision-makers.
It should be noted, that it is not self-evident to what extent the tax legislator can actually in ‡uence tax uncertainty. Whereas high-frequency tax reforms and tax audit uncertainty are certainly the result of …scal activities, many tax reform discussions are triggered by lobbyists rather than by deliberate governmental action.
For future research on tax e¤ects under both cash ‡ow and tax uncertainty, our model can be extended with respect to debt …nancing, compliance costs, di¤erent attitudes towards risk or more complex tax rules. Moreover, our model is well suited to capture the e¤ects of value added tax (VAT) uncertainty. Since many tax authorities are reluctant to refund input VAT, net VAT payment is a stochastic process that is subject to tax authorities' discretion. If investments are high, denial of input VAT refund can threaten a …rm's existence. As a consequence, VAT uncertainty is likely to a¤ect investment behavior.
As our …ndings are purely theoretical we think it is even more interesting to derive testable 
